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Articles 
Middle knowledge: 
The "foreknowledge defense" 
DAVID PAUL HUNT 
Department of Philosophy, Whittier College, Whittier, CA 90608 
A recent article in this journal by Richard Otte, as well as brief passages in 
a couple of books by Jonathan Kvanvig and William Lane Craig, have set 
forth a distinctive strategy for defending middle knowledge from its cri- 
tics. 1 The approach in question ot only differs significantly from other 
defenses of middle knowledge that have been put forward, but also 
captures well one of the main reasons why middle knowledge has come to 
possess whatever plausibility it now enjoys in philosophical circles. I 
happen to think that this defense is not ultimately successful; but since it 
does represent a central strand in the case for middle knowledge, its failure 
is instructive in a way that makes it amply worth re-examining. In under- 
taking such a re-examination, I will focus my comments on the more 
extensive discussion to be found in Otte's article. 
The notion of middle knowledge, which seems to have made its first 
appearance in the course of a 16th-century dispute between the Jesuits and 
the Dominicans over the relationship between divine grace and human 
freedom, 2 has lately re-entered the arena of philosophical debate as a 
result of its employment by Alvin Plantinga in his formulation of the "free 
will defense" against he problem of evil. 3 The free will defense will be 
sufficiently familiar to readers of this journal that it should be unnecessary 
to recapitulate it here; but a brief summary of the way in which middle 
knowledge figures in Plantinga's argument may still be in order. 
Middle knowledge nters the account in the form of an epistemic 
capacity purportedly exercised by God as He tries to decide what type of 
world to create. Obviously the sort of information that would be most 
valuable to God in this situation of cosmic deliberation is a knowledge of 
how things would turn out under the various options open to Him. What 
epistemic resources could God draw upon in order to gain possession of 
such information? Clearly His exhaustive knowledge of pure possibilities, 
which enables Him to calculate all the conceivable ways things could go 
were He to actualize a given cosmic arrangement, is not going to do the 
trick; for in the typical case this will tell Him only that things could go 
exceedingly well and they could also go exceedingly poorly, which is 
mighty thin stuff to stake a world on. What the quest for middle 
knowledge hopes to turn up is some divine talent for selecting a unique 
would out of the innumerable coulds. Is such a capacity intelligible? 
Certainly it is, if we restrict he worlds in question to those in which 
determinism is true; for then God can simply deduce the requisite informa- 
tion from His knowledge of the initial conditions needed to bring such a 
world into existence together with the causal aws operating in that world. 
But what about worlds like our own - worlds which contain free creatures 
whose freedom is understood (as it is by most theists) in a manner incom- 
patible with determinism? 
For one of these libertarian worlds - the one that we know God ul- 
timately decided to actualize - the complete history of events following 
God's creative decree is accessible to Him through His foreknowledge. 
But this will not take Him very far, for at least two reasons. In the first 
place, it is doubtful that He could avail Himself of information based on 
foreknowledge in the context of divine deliberation over which world to 
actualize, a context which is logically prior to any created world being 
actual, and thus foreknowable (it presumably being no easier for the 
Divine Mind to deliberate over what It already knows It is going to do 
than it is for human minds). In the second place, such information would 
be inadequate in any case; for God's eventual decision to create the world 
we know to be actual will fall short of the sagacity expected of the 
Sul~reme Being unless He bases His decision on the judgment hat this 
world is better than (or at least not significantly exceeded by) the available 
alternatives - unless, that is, He also knows how things would go under 
the other choices available to Him, and the actual world compares 
favorably with these. 
Obviously He can know the history of these other (nonactual liber- 
tarian) worlds neither through foreknowledge, nor through a knowledge of 
pure possibilities, nor through extrapolation from initial conditions and 
causal aws. To know what would have happened if a different libertarian 
scheme had been selected evidently requires some further epistemic 
resource. This putative resource is what the Jesuit theologian Luis de 
Molina, called "middle knowledge." It is so-called because it falls some- 
where between a knowledge of what actually happens and a knowledge of 
all the things that logically could happen. Specifically, it is a knowledge of 
counterfactuals offreedom - propositions of the form, "If x were the case, 
A would do y," where x is a counterfactual condition, A is a free agent, and 
y is some action with respect to which A is significantly free. 
For those of us who regard this supposed epistemic resource with 
skepticism, there are at least a couple of ways to respond. One is to deny 
that any propositions of the indicated form could possibly be true. The 
other is to argue that, while there may indeed be true counterfactuals of 
freedom, it is logically impossible for any of them to be objects of 
knowledge. It is not easy to see how the latter argument would go, par- 
ticularly in light of the fact that this stricture on knowledge would have to 
apply to God as well as more limited beings. But the first approach is no 
cakewalk either; in particular, it conflicts with the fact that counterfactuals 
of freedom, such as If Tom had come to the party, Suzy would have left 
and If the light had turned red, I would have stopped, are an integral part 
of daily discourse, and thus would have to be assigned some other linguis- 
tic role if they are barred from ever expressing true propositions. Since 
there do appear to be prima facie difficulties with each of these ap- 
proaches, I am happy to assume (on behalf of the opponents of middle 
knowledge) the burden of proof in this matter, while ceding to Otte the 
enviable position of defender. 
Before examining Otte's defensive strategy, however, something 
should be said about what is really at stake in this conflict. From the role 
that middle knowledge plays in Plantinga's version of the free will 
defense, one could easily conclude that theists hould be cheering on the 
forces of middle knowledge. But this is far from being the case. Middle 
knowledge, as Plantinga himself has recently noted, 4 only makes things 
more difficult for the theodicist. In general, the less God knows (middle or 
otherwise), the less His goodness can be impugned by the existence and 
amount of evil in the world; and if God's ignorance in this regard is 
perfectly compatible with His omniscience (as it would be if there were no 
true counterfactuals of freedom to be known), the orthodox theodicist 
could secure all the advantages of Plantinga's free will defense without 
implicating himself in Plantinga's notorious thesis of "transworld 
depravity." 
It is ironic, then, that the notion of middle knowledge, which was 
reintroduced onto the philosophical stage in a role which turns out to be 
inconsequential, has since found employment in other areas where it could 
actually make a genuine contribution (assuming for the moment that the 
notion itself is coherent). David Basinger, for example, has attempted to 
illuminate the workings of divine providence and foreknowledge from a 
middle-knowledge p rspective, 5 while Del Ratzsch has recently developed 
an account of causal laws based on counterfactuals of divine freedom. 6 
Such efforts need to be acknowledged in determining what is at stake in 
this controversy, though it is too early to say whether these applications 
have the potential to outweigh the ill-effects of middle knowledge on 
theodicy. All things considered, it appears that the overall coherence of 
theism will not be altered ramatically by the success or failure of middle 
knowledge, and that the conflict is therefore one in which theists (qua 
theists, anyway) can afford to remain eutral. 
As it happens, every attack on middle knowledge has taken the first of 
the two approaches mentioned above: a denial that there are any true 
counterfactuals of freedom. 7 Otte constructs his defense of middle 
knowledge with particular attention to the earliest, and still the most 
important, of these attacks, that of Robert Adams in his 1977 article 
"Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil. ''8 Otte sums up the essence 
of Adams' complaint against middle knowledge as follows: "The reason 
Adams believes that conditionals of freedom are necessarily false is that 
he cannot understand what it would be for them to be true. ''9 A similar 
point could be made about another opponent of middle knowledge, 
William Hasker, whose skeptical article on the subject focuses on the 
question, "Who or what is it (if anything) that brings it about that these 
propositions are true? ''1~ Indeed, the question of what it would be for 
counterfactuals of freedom to be true - or, alternatively, what could bring 
about, or cause, or ground their truth - seems to lie at the heart of the 
debate over middle knowledge. Among defenders of middle knowledge 
the tendency has been to dismiss such questions. Plantinga, for example, 
has replied to Adams as follows: "It seems to me much clearer that some 
counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of 
propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way; ''11 and Basinger 
has remarked laconically that "they simply are true. ''12 With one side 
demanding a "ground" (as I will sum up the feature in question) 13 and the 
other side flatly rejecting the demand, things seem to have reached an 
impasse. The differences between the two parties are apparently so deeply 
rooted that further discussion along these lines is unlikely to lead to any 
progress. 
What is distinctive about Otte's strategy is that it is based on a recogni- 
tion of the utter futility of continuing to slog it out over the issue of 
"grounding" while each side rejects the crucial intuitions of the other. In 
the face of this apparent stalemate, Otte proposes a way of approaching 
the issue indirectly. The idea, as I reconstruct i , is to find some other 
genre of knowledge k such that k possesses the following two characteris- 
tics: 
(1) the epistemic acceptability of k - especially the truth of the "k- 
statements" which are the objects of k - is not in dispute; and 
(2) there is no relevant difference between k-statements and counter- 
factuals of freedom with respect to the quality of their 
"grounding." 
If some plausible candidate for k can be identified, then the argument 
would proceed as follows. Adams et al. are claiming that counterfactuals 
of freedom are insufficiently grounded to be true. If this is correct, then no 
statement possessing the same quality of groundedness a counterfactuals 
of freedom should be true. But k comprises true statements possessing the 
same quality of groundedness a counterfactuals of freedom. Therefore we 
must reject the claim that counterfactuals of freedom are insufficiently 
grounded to be true. 
In his article Otte selects divine foreknowledge as the substitution- 
instance for k. 14 The relevant k-statements, then, would be propositions 
about future free choices, or 'futurefactuals of freedom' (as I will term 
them in contrast o counterfactuals of freedom). The first question to be 
asked, then, is, How well does Otte's choice of foreknowledge really 
satisfy (1)? The answer must be that it falls considerably short of expecta- 
tions. 
For a little perspective on this, compare Otte's strategy with the one 
that guides God and Other Minds, 15 where Plantinga rgues that, in virtue 
of crucial similarities in our epistemic situation vis-d-vis belief in other 
minds and belief in God, the rational acceptability of the former accrues to 
the latter as well. There are obvious parallels here with Otte's argument, in 
which middle knowledge, foreknowledge, and quality of groundedness 
play the roles, respectively, of belief in God, belief in other minds, and 
rational acceptability. Whatever the extent of these strategic parallels, 
however, there is a crucial difference in execution: Plantinga's argument 
really does satisfy its version of (1), since the acceptability of belief in 
other minds is not genuinely in dispute. Foreknowledge, on the other hand, 
is highly controversial (even among theists); moreover, such controversy 
concerns not only the proper analysis of foreknowledge, but its very 
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existence as well. The best that Otte can do with regard to (1) is to note 
that foreknowledge is "a doctrine of traditional theism, which Adams does 
not deny. ''16 But whether this is enough to satisfy (1) depends on how 
stable one's commitment to foreknowledge proves to be in the course of 
an argument designed to bring it into conflict with Adams' reasoned 
rejection of middle knowledge. If foreknowledge and middle knowledge 
really do belong in the same epistemic boat, as Otte maintains, then what 
is to prevent Adams et al. from rejecting both together? Perhaps the 
assumption that foreknowledge is "a doctrine of traditional theism" would 
give such critics pause. Still, it is far less costly for a theist o respond to 
Otte's argument with "so much the worse for foreknowledge" than it is for 
the atheist in God and Other Minds to adopt a similar line regarding belief 
in other minds. 17 
In sum, since foreknowledge is far from the epistemic paragon called 
for by (1), it cannot anchor its end of the comparison with middle 
knowledge securely enough to force acceptance of the latter. The most that 
Otte's argument can do, then, is convict of inconsistency those theists who 
accept foreknowledge while rejecting middle knowledge. Perhaps Otte 
would reply that this more modest objective is all he is aiming for - after 
all, his argument is clearly ineffective for anyone who doubts the intel- 
ligibility of foreknowledge. But I deny that even this objective is within 
his reach, since foreknowledge is even less suited to (2) than it is to (1). 
Otte notes that Adams had given brief consideration to a couple of 
proposals for what might ground the truth of counterfactuals of freedom. 
These proposals are (i) that the antecedent of the counterfactual neces- 
sitates the consequent, and (ii) that the actual desires, intentions, and 
character of the agent referred to in the consequent guarantee the truth of 
the counterfactual. But Adams rejects both of these candidates on the basis 
of their incompatibility with free agency: the first for obvious reasons, and 
the second because ven the condition of an agent's will cannot (in a 
libertarian scheme, anyway) guarantee the performance of a particular f ee 
action (the agent may, for example, act out of character). 18Now Otte 
shows that the same two proposals could be put forward as grounds for the 
truth offuturefactuals of freedom, and that they encounter in this context 
the same basic objection they ran up against in the case of counterfactuals 
of freedom: they are incompatible with the assumed freedom of the agent. 
A free agent's future behavior, no less than his counterfactual behavior, 
must be free of necessitation by anything in the present, including facts 
about he agent's will. 
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This comparison of counterfactuals and futurefactuals with respect o 
the two proposals for grounding canvassed in Adams' article constitutes 
the heart of Otte's case for assigning middle knowledge and 
foreknowledge to the same epistemic boat and concluding that the one is 
acceptable just in case the other is. The elaboration of this case consists of 
a reply to a skeptical rejoinder. Suppose the opponent of middle 
knowledge who nevertheless accepts foreknowledge suggests the follow- 
ing ground for the latter: "propositions about future free choices are true 
because what they claim will occur actually occurs. ''19 Unlike the two 
candidates discussed by Adams, which seem to be equally applicable (or 
inapplicable) to counterfactuals and futurefactuals, the present proposal 
marks a distinctive feature of futurefactuals alone, since "The states of 
affairs that make a proposition about a future free choice true will be 
actual at some time, whereas the states of affairs that a conditional of 
freedom is based on may never be actual. ''2~ Otte's response to this line is 
simply that the difference cited is ultimately trivial (perhaps even ir- 
relevant altogether) when it is the grounding of these statements hat is at 
issue; as he puts it, the claim that "propositions about future free choices 
are true because they correspond to what will happen, or what will be 
actual at a certain time ... does not appear to be significantly different 
from saying that conditionals of freedom are true because they correspond 
to what would happen, or what wouM be actual in certain situations. ''21 
This is a surprising statement, at first blush, given the obvious and 
significant differences between will and would, not the least of which is 
the difference cited by Otte himself: the fact that will, but not wouM, is 
wedded indissolubly to the actual world. After all, isn't motedness in the 
actual world precisely the sort of quality that ought to make a crucial 
difference to grounding? What apparantly leads Otte to discount its 
significance, however, is the belief that it masks a more fundamental 
similarity between the two cases, a similarity which he explains as 
follows: "Both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of affairs 
that is neither actual nor is necessitated in any way by what is actual. ''22 
This answer requires a little unpacking. He surely cannot mean, in 
claiming that both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of 
affairs that is not actual, that they thereby correspond to some nonactual 
state of affairs; for futurefactuals are true in virtue of corresponding to an 
actual state of affairs, albeit one that lies in the future (naturally). To rule 
out this unwanted ifference between the two cases, the first and third 'is' 
in the last statement of the preceding paragraph must be taken as tensed, 
with the copula specifically indicating a state of affairs that is (present 
tense) not actual now. Such a construal, however, would exclude the past 
as well as the future, thus omitting an additional source of similarity 
between counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom; for it is also the 
case that both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of affairs 
that neither was actual nor is necessitated by what was actual. This 
suggests that his point should be rephrased as follows: 
(3) Neither counterfactuals of freedom nor futurefactuals of freedom 
are entailed by any state of affairs that has already (past or 
present) been actualized. 
This appears to be the basis upon which he rests his conclusion that "it 
would seem to be no easier to account for true propositions about future 
free actions than it is to account for true conditionals of freedom ... 
Neither is more problematic than the other. ''23 
It's hard to know what to make of this argument. In the first place, it 
seems to assume a fairly narrow view of what can render a statement 
problematic. On what basis could (3), which addresses only one possible 
source of alethic difficulty, be used to underwrite the conclusion that 
counterfactuals of freedom have no problems with grounding not shared 
by futurefactuals of freedom? In other words, what reason do we have for 
accepting (3) as sufficient o satisfy the requirements of (2)? The fact is 
that no such reason has been given, nor is it easy to see what such a reason 
could possibly be. 
In the second place, this argument assumes that the difference between 
counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom with respect o the actual 
future can be overlooked in light of their similarity with respect o the 
actual past and present. But this assumption obviously requires some 
justification. If it is generally true that a difference in one tense is insuffi- 
cient to derail an argument based on a similarity in the remaining two 
tenses (an absurd notion on its face), then the following argument should 
also be valid. Let us define a 'pastfactual of freedom' as a statement about 
a past free choice. Such pastfactuals, however, are similar to counterfac- 
tuals in that both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of affairs 
that is neither present nor future. Therefore (and without further ado), 
"neither is more problematic than the other." But of course this conclusion 
is ridiculous: if a pastfactual like "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is just as 
problematic as a counterfactual like "If Pompey had extended an olive 
branch, Caesar would have remained in Gaul" (let alone Quine's "If 
Caesar had commanded the UN forces in Korea, he would have used the 
atom bomb"), then the whole notion of one statement being more 
problematic than another has been gutted of all content. 24 
It would seem, then, that the justification for Otte's discounting of 
future differences in grounding must have something to do with the 
specific character of the future itself. It is worth quoting in this connection 
the entire passage in which Otte addresses and dismisses his opponent's 
insistence that correspondence with the actual future puts the grounding of 
futurefactuals on a different footing from that of counterfactuals: 
One might respond to my argument by pointing out that there are 
differences between conditionals of freedom and propositions about 
future free choices. For example, we can eventually determine if a 
proposition about a future free choice is true, but we are never able to 
determine if a conditional of freedom is true. The states of affairs that 
make a proposition about a future free choice true will be actual at 
some time, whereas the states of affairs that a conditional of freedom is 
based on may never be actual. However, this does not imply that what 
makes a proposition about a future free choice true is any better 
understood than what makes a conditional of freedom true. Propositions 
about future free choices are true now,  which is before we can deter- 
mine which ones are true, or before the states of affairs that "ground" 
their truth are actual. 25 
Otte appears to be arguing in this passage that the actual future (unlike the 
actual past and present) suffers from a lack of determinateness, and that 
this lack is sufficiently serious to reduce the viability of the future as a 
source of grounding to the same level as a merely possible (i.e., nonactual) 
state of affairs. If successful, this argument would support 
(4) Both counterfactuals of freedom and futurefactuals of freedom are 
true at a [world, time] at which whatever grounds their truth is 
indeterminate 
as a candidate for satisfying the requirements of (2). Indeterminateness, 
however, can be understood in either an epistemological or an ontological 
sense. Otte runs the two senses together in this passage; but if we are to 
evaluate the justice of this charge against the future, we will need to 
disentangle them. 
The epistemological version of Otte's argument, when extracted from 
the above passage, goes as follows: 
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(5) "We can eventually determine if a proposition about a future free 
choice is true, but we are never able to determine if a conditional 
of freedom is true." 
(6) But: "Propositions about future free choices are true now, which is 
before we can determine which ones are true." 
(7) Therefore: The difference between counterfactuals and futurefac- 
tuals cited in (5) "does not imply that what makes a proposition 
about a future free choice true is any better understood than what 
makes a conditional of freedom true." 
Unfortunately, this version of the argument, at least, is an unqualified 
failure. 
In the first place, no argument based (as this one is) on the epistemic 
indeterminateness of the future will succeed in engaging the enemies of 
middle knowledge. Their acceptance of foreknowledge (if they do accept 
it) is not premised on our ability to know which futurefactuals of freedom 
are true; it is premised on such futurefactuals being true (or false) whether 
we know it or not. Likewise their rejection of middle knowledge is not 
based on our failure to determine which counterfactuals of freedom are 
true; it is based on such counterfactuals' failure to be true. Adams' 
complaint concerned what (ontologicaUy) grounds or makes counterfac- 
tuals true, not whether we can (epistemically) determine them to be true. 
Outside the circle of anti-realists, at least, such matters are thought o be 
quite distinct. 
In the second place, the argument is invalid regardless of its intended 
audience. One conclusion that does follow from (5) and (6) is 
(8) The inability of human beings at time t to determine which 
counterfactuals of freedom are true does not (by itself) prevent 
such counterfactuals from being true at t. 
But as we noted in the preceding paragraph, no opponent of middle 
knowledge ver took the position being disputed in (8). This is presumably 
why (8) is not employed as the conclusion of the argument; but (7), the 
conclusion that is actually used, simply does not follow from the purely 
epistemic premises of that argument. Consider the following variation on 
(5)-(7): 
(5") We can eventually determine if a proposition about he planets of 
Sirius is true, but we are never able to determine if a conditional 
of freedom is true. 
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(6') But: Propositions about he planets of Sirius are true now, which is 
before we can determine which ones are true. 
(7') Therefore: The difference between counterfactuals and proposi- 
tions about the planets of Sirius cited in (5') does not imply that 
what makes a proposition about the planets of Sirius true is any 
better understood than what makes a conditional of freedom true. 
But while (5') and (6') are true, (7") is false. It is not necessary to deter- 
mine whether it is true that the Sirian system contains a planet larger than 
Jupiter in order to understand what it is for this proposition to be true. 
In the third place, notice that Otte's epistemological rgument refers 
only to the capacities that we possess: we cannot know which futurefac- 
tuals of freedom are true, therefore we are in the same epistemic position 
regarding both counterfactuals and futurefactuals. But the real issue 
concerns the epistemic position of God, and it is unclear just what is 
supposed to follow for the Supreme Being from the fact that human beings 
lack both these epistemic apacities. Is there anything about our own lack 
of epistemic access to counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom to 
suggest that they must come as a "package deal" (both or neither) for all 
potential knowers? 
Insofar as Otte hints at any justification for such a generalization, it 
seems to be the following. Though many of the limitations upon human 
knowledge are ones that we can easily conceive a Supreme Being 
transcending, this is not so clearly the case when it comes to the strictures 
on human foreknowledge and middle knowledge; for the latter are a 
product of the situation adumbrated in (4), which not only denies posses- 
sion of foreknowledge and middle knowledge to human beings, but also 
makes it exceedingly obscure how any being could have such knowledge. 
The orthodox conception of God, however, assures us of the reality of 
divine foreknowledge. God must, then, know futurefactuals of freedom in 
some basic or logically primitive way that we are unable to grasp. 26 But if 
divine foreknowledge is acceptable in spite of its apparent flouting of (4), 
we have no grounds for denying a similar indulgence to divine middle 
knowledge as well. If it is possible for God to just know futurefactuals of
freedom, and that's all there is to it, there is no apparent reason why He 
couldn't just know counterfactuals of freedom as well. 
If this is how the "package" is tied together, it is a pretty flimsy affair. 
The fact remains that foreknowledge and middle knowledge are 
distinctively different species of (putative) knowledge. 27The claim that 
their fates are nevertheless intertwined, so that the one is rationally 
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acceptable only if the other is also, has been made to depend upon the 
view that the epistemic grounding of each is equally ungraspable. The 
latter, in turn, is supposed to follow from (4). But (4) is a generalization 
based on evidence of human incapacities; why it should apply to God has 
not been explained. Indeed, the suggestion that foreknowledge b longs on 
the same epistemically basic level as middle knowledge is especially 
strange in light of the many accounts that have been offered of how 
foreknowledge might work. For example, one traditional conception of 
God places Him outside of time, so that every temporal event is present to 
Him, rather than being separated from Him by some temporal interval, z8 
As another example, relativity theory has opened up intriguing 
possibilities for how peculiar properties of space and time, or peculiar 
particles like tachyons, could enable information from the future to reach 
the present. 29 For many defenders of foreknowledge, the view that God 
just knows the future, without he merest hint of an explanation of how this 
remarkable talent might operate, would be the position of last resort, if not 
tantamount to an admission of defeat. Even if there are problems (and 
there surely are) with most of the accounts that have been offered - e.g., 
with the intelligibility of an atemporal deity, or the paradoxical conse- 
quences of retrocausation - such problems, and the chances of solving 
them satisfactorily, do not at all appear to be in the same epistemic boat as 
the success or failure of middle knowledge. 
Both the scenarios mentioned above (a timeless God and exotic 
relativity-effects) would allow foreknowledge; neither would render 
middle knowledge possible if it was not possible on other grounds. Before 
concluding that the "package deal" has fallen irretrievably apart, however, 
let us consider one attempt at reconstituting it. Suppose it is claimed that 
scenarios analogous to those that were sketched on behalf of 
foreknowledge could also be constructed on behalf of middle knowledge. 
For a God who surveys all of history from outside of time, the analogue 
would be a deity who is not confined to the actual world, but occupies a
"transcosmic" vantage point from which He can inspect all possible 
worlds while belonging to none. For space-time loops and relativistic 
particles, the analogue would be the possibility of communicating with 
alternative possible worlds, perhaps in something like the manner depicted 
in the story "All the Myriad Ways" by Larry Niven (cited by David Lewis 
as an illustration of modal realism). 30 But whatever the merits of these 
scenarios (and they strike me as much more clearly incoherent than their 
twins introduced in the preceding paragraph), they would do nothing to 
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bring middle knowledge back into the same epistemic package with 
foreknowledge. 
Take the first suggestion of a transcosmic God. If we assume modal 
realism, then a world can be considered actual only from the perspective 
of that same world; from a transcosmic perspective, on the other hand, all 
worlds (or none?) would be actual, and no counterfactuals t all would be 
true (since the truth-conditions for counterfactuals make essential 
reference toa unique actual world). If modal realism is instead enied, the 
actual world would presumably be identifiable from a transcosmic 
standpoint by its concreteness, in contrast to the abstractness of the other 
possible worlds. But which of the latter would be the world that would 
have been actual if the antecedent of some counterfactual of freedom had 
obtained? Would it display a ghostly semi-reality, intermediate b tween 
the concrete and the abstract? (Does middle knowledge require some sort 
of middle being to ground it?) No such questions arise regarding the 
relevance of divine atemporality oforeknowledge, since the world whose 
future grounds the truth of futurefactuals of freedom is readily identifiable 
from an atemporal perspective as the only world that is actual. The same 
point can be made about he second scenario as well. Even if we could 
receive messages from other possible worlds, and we succeeded in 
identifying the possible world from which a particular transcosmic 
message issued, we would be no closer to answering the question upon 
which middle knowledge depends: Is that world, or is it not, the one that 
would have been actual if such-and-such onditions had obtained? 
The epistemological argument, then, fails to associate middle 
knowledge with foreknowledge in any sense that would require us to 
accept he former if we accept he latter. But perhaps Otte's non-epis- 
temological rgument will fare better. It looks like this: 
(9) "The states of affairs that make a proposition about a future free 
choice true will be actual at some time, whereas the states of 
affairs that a conditional of freedom is based on may never be 
actual." 
(10) But: "Propositions about future free choices are true now, which is 
... before the states of affairs that 'ground' their truth are actual." 
(11) Therefore: The difference between counterfactuals nd futurefac- 
tuals cited in (9) "does not imply that what makes a propositition 
about a future free choice true is any better understood than what 
makes a conditional of freedom true." 
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One virtue of this version is that its premises advert o the sort of facts 
that seem relevant to the grounding of counterfactuals and futurefactuals, 
not merely to human epistemic apacities. 
Nevertheless, this argument is no more persuasive than the first one. 
The principal reason is that foreknowledge is grounded in something that 
actually happens, and it is the occurrence of that future event that sanc- 
tions the foreknowledge of it. In contrast, whatever grounds the truth of 
counterfactuals of freedom is something other than an actually occurrent 
event. 31 The indeterminateness of those states of affairs in virtue of which 
counterfactuals of freedom are true is therefore of a wholly different order 
from the indeterminateness of those states of affairs in virtue of which 
futurefactuals of freedom are true. Though the latter are not yet deter- 
minate, they nevertheless will be. Yet according to Otte, this is to count for 
no more than if they were never determinate atall. This is a position that 
needs a good deal more justification than has been forthcoming if it is to 
be considered at all credible. 
In the second place, if the fact that future events are included in the 
actual world is of so little import that they are considered no better 
grounded than nonactual possibilities, it makes it correspondingly easier 
for the orthodox theist o escape Otte's dilemma ltogether by abandoning 
foreknowledge. Some philosophers have understood the indeterminateness 
of the future to entail that statements about future contingencies are 
neither true nor false. Otte evidently does not accept his entailment, since 
he holds that such statements are true now. But he does not say why he 
rejects it. In the absence of any good reason against it, the theist who 
grants Otte's claim regarding the indeterminateness of the future would 
seem well within his rights in concluding that futurefactuals of freedom 
are neither true nor false, and that foreknowledge is therefore not a 
consequence of the traditional doctrine of divine omniscience after all. If 
Otte is also correct in linking the epistemic fate of futurefactuals with that 
of counterfactuals, then the proper conclusion to draw is that God is not in 
a position to know either of them. 
In the third place, what actually follows from the argument is
(12) The nonactuality att of those states of affairs that ground counter- 
factuals of freedom does not (by itself) prevent such counterfac- 
tuals from being true at t. 
But like (8), the conclusion that actually follows from Otte's epistemologi- 
ca1 argument, (12) is nothing that the opponents of middle knowledge 
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have ever been concerned to challenge. 32By suggesting that the most 
serious threat to middle knowledge is its failure to be grounded ap- 
propriately in the actual world, Otte sets up a straw man that diverts our 
attention from the real malady with which middle knowledge is afflicted. 
In order to implement the strategy adumbrated in (1) and (2), Otte must 
(among other things) come up with a characterization f the quality of 
groundedness possessed by futurefactuals of freedom. Given the com- 
parison he ultimately wishes to make with counterfactuals of freedom, he 
draws particular attention to the way in which futurefactuals of freedom 
are ungrounded in any actual states of affairs - or, more perspicuously, the 
way in which such futurefactuals are true at (earlier) times at which the 
states of affairs which ground them are not (yet) actual. Since this is still 
not precisely the situation that obtains with counterfactuals, whose 
grounding may never be actual, Otte must show that this minor difference 
between the two cases does not justify the assignment of a different value 
to their qualities of groundedness. He accomplishes this, not so much by 
closely comparing the two cases and concluding that their grounding is 
similarly structured (i.e., in the way that Plantinga does for the theological 
and analogical' arguments in God and Other Minds), as by insisting that 
the two cases and concluding that their grounding is similarly as by 
insisting that what they have in common - the fact that the truth of such 
propositions does not depend on the present (or past) actuality of those 
states of affairs that ground them - renders them equally mysterious. So 
Otte concludes, "Although there are important differences between 
conditionals of freedom and propositions about future free choices, there 
is no reason to think that we have a better understanding of what it is for 
propositions about future free choices to be true than we do of what it is 
for conditionals of freedom to be t i t le.  ''33 
This assessment of futurefactuals of freedom, it should be noted, is 
exceedingly dubious. The fact that those states of affairs that make a 
proposition about a future free choice true are not now actual but neverthe- 
less will be actual, far from rendering such propositions mysterious, is
precisely what constitutes their truth. Certainly there is no mystery now 
about what grounds the truth of some pundit' s remark on March 15, 1988, 
that Michael Dukakis will be the Democratic nominee for President. It is 
Dukakis's ubsequent s atus as the nominee that made it true then (before 
the states of affairs that grounded it were actual) that he would be the 
nominee. Likewise, if the statement that Jesse Jackson will be the nominee 
in 1992 is true now, it is because his being the nominee will be actual in 
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1992. Though Otte treats such cases as mysterious, it is unclear just what 
the mystery is supposed to be. 
Counterfactuals of freedom, unlike futurefactuals, may indeed be 
mysterious; as a skeptic regarding middle knowledge, I happen to believe 
that they are. Otte grants their mysteriousness, but for a very different 
reason: it is so he can then point out (incorrectly) that futurefactuals of 
freedom share this same mysteriousness, and conclude that anyone who 
accepts foreknowledge while demanding an account of middle knowledge 
is being unreasonable. But Otte has traced the mysteriousness of counter- 
factuals of freedom to the wrong source. Whether a statement requires 
contemporaneous (or any) grounding in the actual world depends on the 
kind of statement that it is. If a statement is not of a kind that requires uch 
grounding, it is unclear why its lack should be mysterious. It is not as 
though actual (contemporaneous) grounding is the only sort available; 
pastfactuals, like futurefactuals of freedom, have a noncontemporaneous 
grounding; statements of pure possibility, like counterfactuals of freedom, 
have a nonactual grounding. 34 
Now the difference in grounding cited in (9) is a difference with respect 
to a standard forfuturefactuals. (11) is quite correct, then, in pointing out 
that the failure of counterfactuals to satisfy this standard is not an adequate 
basis for impugning their intelligibility. But the reason the difference 
between counterfactuals and futurefactuals cited in (9) "does not imply 
that what makes a proposition about a future free choice true is any better 
understood than what makes a conditional of freedom true" is not because 
of something more fundamental that they share (a certain quality of 
groundedness based on (3), (4), or simply the sheer mysteriousness of
their truth); rather, it is because of something they do not share: a single 
standard of grounding. The argument contained in (9)-(11) is therefore 
irrelevant to the project of throwing foreknowledge and middle knowledge 
into the same epistemic boat in such a way that some of the "good name" 
of the former (such as it is) might rub off on the latter. If counterfactuals 
of freedom are problematic, it must be in relation to their own standard of 
grounding, not that of some other variety of proposition. But we never get 
a glimpse of that standard in Otte's article; indeed, it is a significant 
feature of his argument that the nature of counterfactuals remains largely a 
cipher. It is not surprising, then, that the case against middle knowledge is 
transformed in Otte's hands into the divorce of counterfactuals of freedom 
from the actual world, a case quite different from the one that the main 
opponents of middle knowledge would themselves wish to make. 
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Let us retum, then, to Adams' original complaint about the grounding 
of counterfactuals of freedom. It isn't that counterfactuals of freedom lack 
any grounding in what has already occurred or what is presently deter- 
minate (a position that would involve Adams in inconsistency if he also 
endorsed foreknowledge). It isn't even that counterfactuals of freedom 
may lack any grounding whatsoever in the actual world. Rather, the 
problem with counterfactuals of freedOm is that there appears to be a 
contradiction at their very heart. Skepticism regarding the possibility of 
middle knowledge arises primarily from the fact that the force of the 
'would' connecting antecedent and consequent seems incompatible with 
the status of counterfactuals of freedom as propositions about the free 
actions of free agents. When Adams conjures up his two candidates for the 
role of what makes counterfactuals of freedom true, he selects them for the 
express purpose of having something to validate the 'would' that is such a 
characteristic feature of these expressions. It is only after these two 
candidates are in place that he evaluates them according to the second 
criterion: their compatibility with the assumed freedom of the agent. 
Adams' rejection of both candidates is a direct consequence of the 
antagonism between these two criteria. 
Before spelling out the precise nature of the incoherence Adams claims 
to discover at the heart of counterfactuals of freedom, it is worth consider- 
ing why Otte never addresses this question himself in the course of a 
defense of middle knowledge geared specifically to Adams' attack. I think 
the reason for this omission is that Adams' specific complaint against 
counterfactuals of freedom is part of what makes up the ongoing stalemate 
between the opposing forces, and Otte has designed his strategy precisely 
in order to find a way around this deadlock, not to add one more layer of 
forces to the current standoff. Unfortunately, it is harder to avoid the battle 
of entrenched intuitions that separates the two sides than Otte may have 
imagined. His strategy of comparing counterfactuals nd futurefactuals of
freedom inevitably relies upon a particular way of tmderstanding the logic 
of counterfactuals. Adams' rejection of middle knowledge also depends 
upon a particular way of reading counterfactuals. But these two readings 
happen to conflict. Otte's strategy, then, far from avoiding those substan- 
tive issues over which the opposing forces have reached an impasse, 
actually presupposes a particular position on one of those contested issues. 
Let us see how this happens. 
Otte wants to show that counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom 
are alethically similar, so that anyone who accepts the possibility of true 
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futurefactuals of freedom is rationally compelled to accept he possibility 
of true counterfactuals of freedom. Now the modal picture presupposed by 
the futurefactual of freedom A will do y is one in which (i) there is a 
plurality of possible worlds sharing their past history with the actual world 
but diverging from each other into the future, (ii) in at least one of these 
worlds A does y, (iii) in at least one of these worlds A does not do y, and 
(iv) a privileged status (i.e., actuality) is claimed on behalf of one of the 
worlds in which A does y. The central move in Otte's argument, however 
- that "an account of what it is for propositions about future choices to be 
true is very similar to an account of what it is for conditionals of freedom 
to be true ''35 -, has no hope of acceptance unless the modal picture 
presupposed by counterfactuals of freedom is the spitting image of the one 
just sketched for futurefactuals. That is, Otte's whole strategy is built on 
the assumption that the counterfactual of freedom I f  x were the case, A 
would do y is such that (i') there is a plurality of possible worlds sharing 
their past history with the-actual-world-minimally-modified-to- 
accommodate-x but diverging from each other into the future, (ii') in at 
least one of these worlds A does y, (iii') in at least one of these worlds A 
does not do y, and (iv') a privileged status (i.e., "counterfactuality," or the 
way things would be i f . . . )  is claimed on behalf of one of the worlds in 
which A does y. In other words, just as there is a particular way things will 
turn out under actual conditions (without his closing off the alternatives 
required by free agency), so there is also a particular way things will turn 
out under specified counterfactual conditions (without his closing off the 
alternatives required by free agency either). 
At the beginning of this essay I claimed that Otte's article, while novel 
in the strategy it pursues, also casts into sharper elief one of the main 
reasons why middle knowledge has appeared plausible to its various 
supporters all along. What I had in mind when I made that claim is Otte's 
assumption, adumbrated in the previous paragraph, that counterfactualS of 
freedom (with the exception of their characteristic counterfactual shift) 
share exactly the s~rne modal structure as futurefactuals of freedom. 
Plantinga makes this assumption as well: 
suppose we think about a state of affairs that includes Curley's having 
been offered $20,000, all relevant conditions - Curley's financial 
situation, his general acquisitive tendencies, his venality - being the 
same as in fact, in the actual world. Our question is really whether there 
is something Curley would have done had this state of affairs been 
actual ... 
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The answer, I should think, is obvious and affirmative. There is 
something Curley would have done, had that state of affairs obtained ... 
[As to what he would have done,] we may not know what that answer 
is; but we should reject out of hand, I should think, the suggestion that 
there simply is none. 36 
A detailed critique of Plantinga's own defense of middle knowledge is 
obviously outside the scope of this paper; but notice that his positive 
grounds for accepting counterfactuals of freedom, as expressed in the 
above passage, rest squarely on the same assumption as that of Otte: that 
just as there is a particular way things will turn out under actual condi- 
tions, so there is also a particular way things will turn out under specified 
counterfactual conditions. It is this assumption, I believe, that is primarily 
responsible for encouraging the partisans of middle knowledge in the 
notion that there is no more problem with counterfactuals of freedom than 
there is with futurefactuals (or other indicatives) of freedom. 
This is a highly controversial ssumption; moreover, it is an assumption 
that is rejected by the opponents of middle knowledge, for whom the 
apparent similarity between counterfactuals nd futurefactuals of freedom 
(and between subjunctives and indicatives generally) is an illusion. The 
reason they take this position is that a would seems to imply a certain 
necessity (which is what prompts David Lewis to include the necessity- 
operator as part of his symbolization for counterfactual conditionals). If it 
is true that, under given conditions (whether actual or counterfactual), A 
might do y and A might not do y, then one cannot also say that under those 
conditions A would do y. Yet the assumption that A is free with respect to 
y entails (on the libertarian conception of freedom shared by all other 
participants in the middle-knowledge d bate and not disputed by Otte) 
that, under given conditions, A might do y and A might not do y. There- 
fore, if A is free with respect to y, it cannot be true to say that A would do 
y. This, in short, is the basis for Adams' claim that all counterfactuals of 
freedom are necessarily false. 
But one can say, under those same conditions, that A will do y. Thus the 
genuine crux in counterfactuals of freedom, as opposed to the pseudo- 
cruces discussed by Otte, cannot be used to book passage for middle 
knowledge on the same epistemic boat as foreknowledge. The difference 
in futurefactuals that renders them compatible with free agency is that 
their truth is grounded in the actualization of one particular pathway 
through the branching pattems of future possibilities compatible with the 
actual past and present. Since they entail only that A do y in one of the 
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relevant worlds (namely, that one whose future turns out to be actual), 
they leave open plenty of other relevantly similar worlds in which A may 
refrain from y, as the conditions for free agency require. 
Counterfactuals of freedom, on the other hand, cannot be grounded in 
the actualization of one pathway out of a plurality of possibilities. (That is 
the real significance of their disjunction from the actual world, of which 
Otte makes so much). How, then, are they grounded? In the semantics for 
counterfactuals developed by Lewis, this ground involves a kind of 
monopoly exercised by counterfactuals over all the relevant possible 
worlds: the claim that A would do y if antecedent condition x were to 
obtain entails that A do y in all the relevantly similar x-worlds, leaving 
none available for A's pursuit of other options. Assuming that this reading 
of counterfactuals is correct, there appears to be an insuperable obstacle to 
any consequent of a true counterfactual conditional giving expression to a 
free action. But if this reading of counterfactuals is somehow mistaken, 
Otte needs to show why; the issue cannot be avoided through a strategy of 
"neutrally" comparing middle knowledge with foreknowledge, since this 
strategy itself rests upon a particular eading of counterfactuals, and thus 
assumes the very point at issue. 37, 38 
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